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FIFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS AND UEFA PLAYER
ELIGIBILITY RULES: MAJOR CHANGES IN EUROPEAN
FOOTBALL AND THE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON MINORS
Behind the European love affair with football1—the packed stadiums, the
rowdy fans, the time off from work to watch important matches—lies a
significant dilemma: on one hand, fans want their teams to play at the highest
competitive level, but on the other, they care about the backgrounds and
nationality of the players on their locally-based teams.2 This dilemma has led
to the promulgation of various transfer regulations by the governing bodies of
international football that control a player’s ability to transfer to a foreign
team.3 The changing of these transfer regulations over time, however, has had
a negative impact on many minors4 who play football. In particular, European
football clubs have exploited various loopholes in the transfer regulations to
recruit young foreign players and retain young local players.5 Some of these
measures include creating jobs for the children’s parents so they can legally
move to Europe,6 entering into contracts with minors at a young age,7 and
using loopholes found in immigration laws throughout the European Union
(“EU”).8 In the worst cases, unlicensed agents are trafficking minors from
Africa to Europe.9 This Comment looks at the evolution of the regulations
governing player mobility and its impact on minors.
The modern saga of who can play on which team began with the Bosman
case,10 the seminal case that deals with transfer regulations in European
football. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decided the case in 1995.11
Bosman created free transferability for players with expired contracts and

1

In this Comment, the term “football” refers to American soccer.
See Srikanth Iyer, It’s All About Nationality, ISPORT (Aug. 10, 2009, 11:43 PM), http://www.isport.in/
european-football/its-all-about-nationality-654.
3 See infra Part III.
4 In this Comment, the term “minor” refers to persons under the age of eighteen.
5 See infra Part IV.
6 See infra Part IV.
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See infra Part V.A.
9 See infra Part V.B.
10 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I5040.
11 Id.
2
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opened the door for the recruitment of foreign players12—including teenagers
and even children. The ECJ based its decision on a fundamental right under the
laws of the EU: the freedom of movement for workers between countries
within the EU.13 After the Bosman case, Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (“FIFA”),14 the organization governing world football,
promulgated new transfer regulations, and the Union of European Football
Associations (“UEFA”),15 the continental confederation that sits under FIFA
and governs European football, promulgated new player eligibility
restrictions.16 Unfortunately, these regulations did not resolve all the issues
presented in Bosman, and in turn, created even greater issues in relation to
minor football players. In an effort to create greater protection for minors,
FIFA promulgated new regulations in October 2009.17 Although the effects of
these regulations have yet to be seen, many strategies that clubs employ to
obtain young players are outside the scope of FIFA’s control, and these
problems need to be evaluated and fixed on a European and international scale.
This Comment explores the problems and proposes solutions for FIFA and
UEFA, the EU, and other international and independent organizations.
Part I gives a general overview of the organizations that govern
international and European football and the EU institutions that play a role in
European football. Part II discusses the history of football transfer regulations,
with a particular focus on the ECJ’s ruling in the Bosman case. Part III
explains the FIFA transfer regulations created after the Bosman case in 2001,
FIFA’s amended transfer regulations of 2005, and UEFA’s player eligibility
rules. Part IV discusses the football clubs’ reactions to these rules and their
efforts to recruit and sign young talent. Part V analyzes the legal problems that
result from the clubs’ actions within the framework of European and
international law. Part VI discusses FIFA’s attempt to fix these problems with
the 2009 transfer regulations, and points out potential problems. Finally, Part
VII suggests solutions to the problems that should be implemented by FIFA
and UEFA, the EU, and other international and independent organizations.

12

See infra Part II.C.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5068, I-5071.
14 For a more detailed description, see infra Part I.A.
15 Id.
16 See infra Part III.D.
17 FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2009) [hereinafter FIFA RSTP
(2009)],
available
at
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/66/98/97/
regulationsstatusandtransfer_en_1210.pdf.
13
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING EUROPEAN FOOTBALL
This Part gives a general overview of the three main powers that influence
the transfer regulations in European football: FIFA, UEFA, and the EU
institutions. One main problem with the football transfer regulations results
from the fact that the FIFA and UEFA regulations conflict with laws of the
EU.18 Additionally, individual countries within the EU have different laws that
FIFA and UEFA must take into account, which is discussed further in Part V.
A. Governing Organizations of International and European Football: FIFA
and UEFA
The structure of international football is hierarchical.19 FIFA, the governing
organization of international football, sits at the top of the hierarchy.20 FIFA
was created in 1904 under Swiss law to create an international structure for
football.21 FIFA commits itself to constantly improving the sport.22 The FIFA
Statutes form the overarching document guiding FIFA’s governing system.23
The governing system is divided into separate bodies that have the appropriate
powers to create a system of checks and balances.24 It consists of four general
bodies:25 the Congress,26 the Executive Committee,27 the general secretariat,28
and standing and ad-hoc committees.29 For the purposes of this Comment it is
important to note that the Executive Committee “regulate[s] the status of
[p]layers and the provisions for their transfer,”30 and that the Players’ Status
18

See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040.
Lindsey J. Meân, Making Masculinity and Framing Femininity: FIFA, Soccer, and World Cup
Websites, in EXAMINING IDENTITY IN SPORTS MEDIA 65, 66 (Heather L. Hundley & Andrew C. Billings eds.,
2010).
20 Id.
21 The Federation, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/index.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
22 FRANS DE WEGER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FIFA DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER 1 (2008).
23 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES STANDING
ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS (2009) [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES], available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/
document/affederation/federation/01/24/fifastatuten2009_e.pdf.
24 Id. art. 21.
25 Id.
26 Under the FIFA Statutes, “Congress is the supreme and legislative body.” Id. art. 21(1).
27 The Executive Committee “is the executive body.” Id. art. 21(2). It “consists of 24 members: 1
President elected by Congress, 8 vice-presidents, and 15 members, appointed by the Confederations and
[National] Associations.” Id. art. 30(1).
28 The general secretariat acts as “the administrative body.” Id. art. 21(3).
29 The standing and ad hoc committees “advise and assist the Executive Committee in fulfilling its
duties.” Id. art. 21(4).
30 Id. art. 5.
19
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Committee is the standing committee that is responsible for monitoring
compliance with the transfer regulations.31
Below FIFA sit six confederations that are divided roughly by continent,
which create the next level of the hierarchy.32 Each continental confederation
has a governing body similar to FIFA’s and can create separate rules and
regulations so long as they are not in conflict with FIFA’s rules and
regulations.33 These continental confederations oversee the national
associations, which are assigned to a confederation based on continent.34 The
national associations can also create separate rules and regulations so long as
they are not in conflict with the corresponding confederation’s rules or FIFA’s
rules.35 As of the writing of this Comment, 208 national football associations
are members of FIFA.36 Each national association oversees all the individual
clubs, which are separated into divisions based on their level of competition.37
Finally, the individual players are divided among all the clubs.38
UEFA is one of the six confederations under FIFA and one of the largest in
terms of strength and wealth.39 As of 2011, UEFA oversees fifty-three national
football associations.40 UEFA administers football games through the national
associations and through its own competitions.41 UEFA has a governing
structure similar to FIFA’s that consists of four “organs” that UEFA may act
through.42 These organs are the Congress,43 the Executive Committee,44 the

31

Id. art. 49.
These continental confederations include: Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (“CONMEBOL”),
Asian Football Confederation (“AFC”), Union des Associations Européennes de Football (“UEFA”),
Confédération Africaine de Football (“CAF”), Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean
Association Football (“CONCACAF”), and Oceania Football Confederation (“OFC”). Id. art. 20(1).
33 See id. art. 20(3)–(5).
34 FIFA may give confederations authority to grant membership to a national association that is not
geographically located within its continent. Id. art. 20(2).
35 See id. arts. 12–13 (explaining Members’ rights and duties in relation to FIFA).
36 FIFA’s Member Associations, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/associations.html
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
37 See, e.g., JOSÉ LUIS ARNAUT, INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN SPORT REVIEW 57 (2006).
38 Id.
39 UEFA, ECONOMICEXPERT.COM, http://www.economicexpert.com/a/UEFA.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2011); UEFA, SOLAR NAVIGATOR, http://www.solarnavigator.net/sport/UEFA.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
40 About UEFA, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
41 Id.
42 UEFA, UEFA STATUTES: RULES OF PROCEDURE OF CONGRESS REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATUTES 12 (2007) [hereinafter UEFA Statues], available at http://www.uefa.com/
newsfiles/19081.pdf.
43 The Congress is “the supreme controlling Organ of UEFA.” Id.
32
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President,45 and the Organs for the Administration of Justice.46 This separation
of powers guarantees a system of checks and balances similar to FIFA’s.47
B. European Union Institutions
The European Union is the product of economic and political regional
integration.48 As of the writing of this Comment, the EU has twenty-seven
member states.49 This unionization results in the creation and implementation
of laws and policies that sit above the national laws and policies of the member
states.50 The EU has five institutions responsible for governing the European
Community.51 These institutions are the European Parliament, the European
Council, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the
European Court of Auditors.52 The institutions most relevant in the discussion
of European football are the European Commission (the “Commission”), the
European Parliament, and the ECJ.
The Commission is “the executive-bureaucratic arm” of the EU.53 It
focuses on representing the interests of the EU in its entirety.54 The
Commission drafts and proposes laws and policies to the European Parliament
and European Council55—two institutions that often jointly pass EU

44

The Executive Committee “consist[s] of the President and fifteen other members elected by a
Congress.” Id. at 16. It has “the power to make decisions on all matters which do not fall within the legal or
statutory jurisdiction of the Congress or another Organ.” Id.
45 For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to note that the President is responsible for relations
between UEFA and FIFA. Id. at 19. The President also serves as the chair at the Congress and meetings of the
Executive Committee. Id. at 19
46 The “Organs for the Administration of Justice are: the Control and Disciplinary Body; the Appeals
Body; [and] the Disciplinary Inspector.” Id. at 20.
47 ARNAUT, supra note 37, at 58.
48 See JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Neill Nugent, William E.
Patterson & Vincent Wright eds., 2005) (1999) (concluding that the EU is the world’s most evolved example
of regional integration).
49 The 27 Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-membercountries/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
50 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 25.
51 Institutions of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2011).
52 Id.
53 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 82.
54 The European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2011).
55 Id.
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legislation.56 Once these laws and policies are adopted, the Commission
oversees their execution.57
The ECJ is the highest judicial body of the EU.58 Its goal is to ensure that
the member states of the EU uniformly apply EU legislation.59 The ECJ also
ensures that national and European laws are consistent with EU treaties.60 The
ECJ has the power to settle legal disputes between member states, institutions,
businesses, and individuals.61 The Court’s decisions regarding European sport
and the free movement of workers in the EU are of particular importance and
are discussed further throughout this Comment.62
II. HISTORY OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL AND THE
BOSMAN CASE
This Part first gives an overview of the early transfer regulations used by
FIFA and UEFA and also describes the problems that the regulations posed for
players. This Part then focuses on the case of a particular football player, JeanMarc Bosman, who fought for his rights through the court systems until the
ECJ ruled that the transfer regulations violated EU law.63 Specifically, the ECJ
held that requiring transfer fees for out-of-contract players and establishing
quotas that limit the number of foreign players on a team violate the
fundamental right of freedom of movement for EU workers.64 Finally, this Part
discusses the decision’s immediate effects on the transfer of players in
European football.

56

Welcome to the European Parliament, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
parliament/public/staticDisplay.do;jsessionid=A8C681059D7F888873A6DE9332C56FEF.node2?id=146&lan
guage=en (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
57 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 82.
58 Karen Yvonne Crabbs & Jack J. Coe, Jr., The European Union: An Introduction to Supra-national
Law in Europe, in I LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE 37, 45 (Christian Campbell ed., 2007).
59 The Court of Justice, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm (last visited Jan.
28, 2011).
60 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 100.
61 The Court of Justice, EUROPA, supra note 59.
62 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.
63 See infra Part II.B.
64 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I5040, I-5073, I-5078.
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A. Transfer Regulations Before Bosman
The original FIFA transfer regulations permitted each continental
confederation to create its own transfer regulations under the broad FIFA
transfer regulations.65 UEFA took advantage of this right and enforced its own
transfer regulations for its national associations.66 Two of these regulations
became topics of dispute. The first regulation gave each player a right to
transfer to a foreign club when his contract with his then-current club
expired,67 but required the player’s new club to pay the player’s former club a
transfer fee.68 UEFA created the transfer fee to compensate the former club for
the player’s training and development costs.69 In actuality, clubs generally
required transfer fees that exceeded the cost of a player’s training and
development.70 This was a great benefit and a source of revenue for the
player’s former club, and not surprisingly a burden for the new club.
The second UEFA regulation, colloquially called the “3+2 rule,” required
national associations to limit the number of foreign players on a club during a
first division match to three foreign players plus two “assimilated” players.71
Assimilated players were foreign players who continuously played with a
national association for five years.72 The assimilated players had to complete
three of those five years on a junior team.73
Just as the FIFA regulations permitted each continental confederation to
establish transfer regulations, UEFA permitted its national associations to
create their own transfer regulations.74 In accordance with the hierarchy of
international football, the national association’s transfer regulations must not
conflict with the FIFA and UEFA transfer regulations.75 FIFA regulations also
provided that an international transfer could only take place if “the former

65

Id. at I-5047.
Amikan Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The Relationship Between European Union Law and the
Transfer System in European Football, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431, 435 (1999).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See STEFAAN VAN DEN BOGAERT, PRACTICAL REGULATION OF THE MOBILITY OF SPORTSMEN IN THE
EU POST BOSMAN 210 (2005).
71 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I5040, I-5073, I-5078; Kranz, supra note 66, at 435.
72 Kranz, supra note 66, at 435.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See supra Part I.A.
66
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national association issued a transfer certificate acknowledging that all
financial commitments, including any transfer fee, had been settled.”76
Therefore, a player could not transfer if the national association governing the
club withheld a transfer certificate. These transfer regulations limited players’
career choices and gave the associations and clubs great power over the
players.
B. The Bosman Case
Not surprisingly, players disliked these regulations. One such player, JeanMarc Bosman, a Belgian national, took his complaints to the local and national
courts, and the national court submitted it to the ECJ.77 Bosman played for
Royal Club Liégois SA (“RC Liège”), a Belgian first division club that was
subject to the Belgian national association’s transfer regulations.78 Bosman
received an average monthly salary of 120,000 Belgian francs.79 At the end of
Bosman’s original contract, RC Liège offered him a one-season contract.80 The
club, however, reduced his salary to the minimum permitted salary of 30,000
Belgian francs.81
Bosman refused RC Liège’s offer and was placed on the compulsory
transfer list,82 and then entered into the free transfer period.83 During this
period, US Dunkerque, a French second division club, contacted Bosman and
offered him a significantly higher salary and a large signing bonus.84 RC Liège
doubted US Dunkerque’s solvency and ability to pay the transfer fee, however,
and refused to issue the transfer certificate required by FIFA regulations for
international transfers.85 Even though US Dunkerque wanted to sign Bosman,

76

Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5047.
See generally id.
78 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5050.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 If an out-of-contract player did not receive or accept a new contract from his former club, he was
placed on the compulsory transfer list. Id. at I-5045. Other clubs could sign players on this list by paying the
player’s former club a pre-calculated transfer fee. Id.
83 Id. at I-5050. If a player did not join a team by the end of the compulsory transfer period, then he
entered into a free transfer period. Id. at I-5045. Despite the name, this period did not result in a “free” transfer.
Rather, the player, his former club, and the new club had to settle on the transfer fee that the new club had to
pay to the former club. Id.
84 US Dunkerque offered Bosman a monthly salary of approximately 100,000 Belgian francs plus a
signing bonus of approximately 900,000 Belgian francs. Id. at I-5050–51.
85 Id. at I-5051.
77
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he was ultimately left without a contract for the upcoming season.86 To make
matters worse, RC Liège suspended Bosman for the entire season.87
After working its way through the court systems for five years, Bosman’s
case was heard by the ECJ.88 The ECJ previously established jurisdiction over
sports-related disputes in Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale.89 In
Walrave, the ECJ determined that sport is subject to European Community
Law if it is considered “an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2
of the Treaty.”90 Although sport was not explicitly covered in European
Community Law,91 the ECJ established jurisdiction over cases involving
certain sports-related disputes by classifying them as an economic activity.92
Therefore, so long as the sport-related issue is considered an economic activity
under European Community Law, the ECJ will have jurisdiction to hear the
case.
In Bosman, the court upheld its jurisdiction over the case and determined
that football constitutes an economic activity when the players are gainfully
employed and receiving remuneration.93 Two questions were presented to the
ECJ regarding the applicability of particular transfer regulations under EU
law.94 Both questions were posed in light of the ECJ’s interpretation of Articles

86

Id.
Id.
88 Kranz, supra note 66, at 436.
89 Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405.
90 Id. at 1417. In Walrave and in Bosman, the “Treaty” refers to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which
established the European Economic Community. This treaty was amended and renumbered in the Treaty of
Amsterdam and was renamed the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which entered into force on
May 1, 1999. As of December 1, 2009, however, the Treaty of Lisbon became the effective treaty, which
renamed the Treaty Establishing the European Community to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. See Treaties and Law, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
Therefore, the numbering of the articles that the ECJ used in Bosman has changed two times since the decision
in 1995. This Comment refers to the articles as they are numbered in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
91 The Treaty of Rome and The Treaty of Amsterdam did not explicitly cover sports. See STEPHEN C.
SIEBERSON, DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES: THE IMPACT OF THE
TREATY OF LISBON 235 (2008). Therefore, the ECJ had to gain jurisdiction over sports-related disputes through
the economic provisions of the European Community Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty, however, sports are
now mentioned. See TFEU art. 165(1).
92 Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1417.
93 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I5040, I-5063.
94 Id. at I-5056.
87
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45, 101, and 102 of the TFEU.95 The ECJ first applied Article 45 to each
question.96 Article 45 requires the free movement of workers within the
European Community.97 Freedom of movement is a right granted to all
nationals of member states. It permits them to move from their country of
origin to another member state in pursuit of economic activity.98 Article 45
also entails “the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other
conditions of work and employment.”99
The ECJ first addressed whether the transfer regulations were an obstacle
to free movement of players between clubs in that they permitted clubs to
collect transfer fees for players who were no longer under contract.100 Under
Article 45, “[Freedom of movement for workers] shall entail the right, subject
to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely
within the territory of Member States for this purpose . . . .”101 Supporters of
the transfer fees argued that the regulations were necessary “to maintain a
financial and competitive balance between clubs.”102 They also argued that the
transfer fees support “the search for talent and the training of young

95
96
97

Id.
Id. at I-5062, I-5073–74.
Article 45 of the TFEU reads as follows:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality
between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other
conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public
security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the
provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State,
subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the
Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.

TFEU art. 45.
98 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5068.
99 TFEU art. 45.
100 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5062.
101 TFEU art. 45.
102 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5057.
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players.”103 The court, however, agreed with Bosman who argued that the
regulations did not create a financial or competitive balance between clubs.104
The rich clubs were still able to obtain the most talented players and a club’s
financial resources were still a factor in its level of competition.105 Therefore,
the ECJ concluded that Article 45 precludes sporting associations from
requiring a transfer fee for a player who wants to transfer at the expiration of
his contract,106 that is, an “out-of-contract” transfer. The case did not address a
player’s ability to move to another team when he is still under his current
contract.107
The second question focused on whether UEFA’s 3+2 rule obstructed the
free movement of workers by limiting the number of non-national players
allowed to play for a club in official matches.108 The ECJ called these
regulations nationality clauses.109 Opponents of the nationality clauses relied
on Article 45(2), which prohibits discrimination of workers in the European
Union based on nationality because it obstructs the free movement for
workers.110 Proponents of the nationality clauses argued that they were created
on non-economic grounds to uphold the link between the players, the clubs,
and their countries.111 They claimed that the nationality clauses allowed clubs
to properly represent their countries in international matches and helped the
fans identify with the clubs.112 These arguments failed, however, because these
rules applied to all official matches, not just specialized international matches
such as the World Cup, which require players to represent their national
teams.113
The proponents of the nationality clauses also pointed out that the transfer
rules were drafted in collaboration with the European Commission, which has
the goal of proposing rules consistent with European law.114 In response to this
argument, the ECJ pointed out that “the Commission may not give guarantees

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at I-5073.
See DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 5.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5073.
Id. at I-5049.
Id. at I-5074; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5075.
Id.
Id. at I-5076.
Id.
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concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the Treaty.”115
Additionally, the Commission never has the authority to support practices that
contradict the Treaty.116 Therefore, the Court concluded that Article 45
precludes sporting associations from creating regulations that limit the number
of players a club may field from outside its nation.117 The ECJ decided not to
answer the two questions with respect to Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty,
which deal with competition law,118 because both of the regulations in question
violated Article 45 of the Treaty.119
C. Transfers After the Bosman Case
The Bosman case was limited to “out-of-contract” players, that is, players
whose contract had ended.120 Because of the case’s limited application, FIFA
and UEFA could still enforce transfer fees for players under contract.121 As a
result, clubs began extending the terms of players’ contracts to prevent their
players from moving to another team without being able to collect a transfer
fee.122 Clubs even “forced players to sign a new contract before the old one
expired.”123 In an attempt to offset the revenue lost from out-of-contract
transfer fees, clubs would charge huge transfer fees when players broke their
contracts before the end of the term.124 Although this replaced some of the lost
income, it did not replace it all. The competitive imbalance began to increase.
Small clubs that previously depended on transfer fees as a source of income
were not receiving enough money to attract quality players.125 The larger clubs
could offer the best players better-paid contracts by diverting the money that
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Id. at I-5078.
Id.
117 Id.
118 See TFEU arts. 101–02.
119 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5078.
120 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 5.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 640 (Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymański eds, 2006).
124 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 5; see also ROGER BLANPAIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF SPORTSMEN AND
SPORTSWOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND BELGIAN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW 215 (2003).
125 Simon Stone, FIFA Fears for Small Clubs Over Transfer Abolition, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 1, 2000),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/fifa-fears-for-small-clubs-over-transferabolition-637523.html.
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was previously allocated to transfer fees to players’ salaries.126 Players’
salaries also increased due to inflow of broadcasting revenues in the 1990s.127
Additionally, the abolition of the 3+2 rule fostered an increase in
international transfers.128 There was “a 1,800 percent increase in foreign
players in the [English] Premiership”129 over the four years following the
Bosman decision.130 Clubs also began to enter into exchange agreements and
form alliances with clubs from different national associations within Europe.131
Some European clubs exploited this opportunity by forming exchange
agreements with other national associations within the EU that have more
flexible nationality and work permit rules.132 This grants the clubs access to
talented non-EU nationals who can achieve EU status more easily in a different
EU country.133 Clubs also began making deals with non-European clubs to
expand their talent pools.134 For example, Ajax of Amsterdam “entered into a
franchise agreement in South Africa,” giving them priority over new players
who exhibit great potential.135
The abolition of the 3+2 rule also led clubs to invest in foreign youth.136
After the Bosman case, “clubs in countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, [saw] their young
football talents ‘stolen’ by wealthier teams from England, Italy, and Spain who
offer[ed] better-paid contracts.”137 Rather than spending more money on

126

Id.
Simon Gardiner & Roger Welch, ‘Show Me the Money’ Regulation of the Migration of Professional
Sportsmen in Post-Bosman Europe, in PROFESSIONAL SPORT IN THE EU: REGULATION AND RE-REGULATION
107, 114 (Andrew Caiger & Simon Gardiner eds., 2000).
128 Id.
129 The Premiership, also known as the Premier League, is a division of twenty elite English football
clubs. About Us, PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premierleague.com/page/Contact (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
The membership of these twenty clubs is dependent of their level of performance, and the clubs are technically
shareholders of the Premier League. Id. The Premier League comes under the jurisdiction of the Football
Association, the national football association for England, and UEFA. See id.
130 Gardiner & Welch, supra note 127, at 117.
131 Id. at 114–15.
132 For example, the English club Manchester United likely entered into an agreement with Royal
Antwerp, a Belgian club, because of their “more permissive nationality and work permits rules.” Id.
133 Id. at 115.
134 Id.
135 Id. This agreement is still in force, and the South African franchise Ajax Cape Town is still operating
today. See AJAX CAPE TOWN, http://www.ajaxct.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
136 PAULO DAVID, HUMAN RIGHTS IN YOUTH SPORT: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN
COMPETITIVE SPORTS 173–74 (2005).
137 Id. at 174.
127
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training academies138 for their own players, clubs would scout foreign talent at
the biggest youth competitions in Europe.139 Clubs tended to favor this
approach because of the greater certainty in recruiting young players who
showed promise at these competitions.140 Many clubs preferred investing in
young foreign players rather than their own youth training academies.141
Investment in foreign youth, however, has led to harmful effects, particularly
in creating an illegal market for fake agents to traffic minors from Africa to
Europe.142
III. FIFA AND UEFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS AFTER THE BOSMAN RULING
This Part discusses FIFA’s initial defiance of the ruling in Bosman and its
eventual compliance with the European Commission, which resulted in the
creation of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players in
2001.143 These new regulations, however, did not sufficiently protect minors
and resulted in some of the same negative effects, such as importing foreign
youth discussed below in Part IV. FIFA revised the transfer rules again in 2005
and made significant changes to the transfer rules for minors.144 These
regulations were a step in the right direction, but significant problems
remained. The regulations required clubs to ensure proper education and
training for the minors in certain circumstances, but not all, and there were still
enough loopholes in the system for clubs to continue to transfer minors
internationally.145 In 2005, UEFA created new player eligibility restrictions,
which required clubs to reserve a certain number of spots on their roster for
138 Most recently, FIFA has defined “training academy” as “an organisation or an independent legal entity
whose primary, long-term objective is to provide players with long-term training through the provision of the
necessary training facilities and infrastructure. This shall primarily include, but not be limited to, football
training centres, football camps, football schools, etc.” FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 6.
139 DAVID, supra note 136, at 173–74.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
143 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 3.
144 The FIFA Circular regarding the 2005 FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players,
however, did not mention that the rule changes were meant to protect minors. See Circular No. 959: FIFA
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.fifa.com/mm/
document/affederation/administration/circular_959_en_92.pdf. Cf. Circular No. 1190: Revised Regulations on
the Status of Transfers of Players–Protection of Minors, FIFA (May 20, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/mm/
document/affederation/administration/01/06/29/81/circularno.1190-revisedregulationsonthestatusandtransferof
players-protectionofminors.pdf. Rather, it focused more on jurisdictional issues regarding the Players’ Status
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Circular No. 959: FIFA Regulations for the Status and
Transfer of Players, supra.
145 See infra note 186.
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locally trained players, due to the influx of foreign players after the Bosman
decision.
A. FIFA’s Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (2001)
Despite all the problems resulting from the clubs’ reactions to the Bosman
decision, FIFA was reluctant to reform the transfer system, mainly because incontract transfers constituted almost ninety percent of transfer revenues.146
After many debates and negotiations between FIFA, UEFA, and the
Commission, FIFA formalized new transfer regulations entitled the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP (2001)”), which
entered into force in September 2001.147 RSTP (2001) set forth five major
provisions for the new transfer system.
First, the regulations required that the term of players’ contracts be at least
one year, but no more than five years.148 This regulation was likely adopted to
prevent clubs from creating overly long terms for players’ contracts so that
they would be more likely to get a transfer fee from a player who transferred
before his contract expired. FIFA, however, also wanted to promote stability of
players’ contracts, which resulted in the creation of a protected period after a
player signs his first professional contract during which he cannot unilaterally
terminate the contract.149 Depending on the player’s age, this protected period
would last two to three years.150
Second, RSTP (2001) only permitted international transfers during two
designated transfer windows per season. It created one short transfer window
in the middle of each season and one longer transfer window before the start of
each season.151 Each player could only transfer between national associations
once during the season.152 Additionally, the shorter mid-season window was
limited to transfers “for strictly sport-related reasons, such as technical
adjustments to a team or the replacement of injured players, or in exceptional
circumstances.”153
146 James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle Over European Football’s Transfer System, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 667, 688–89 (2002).
147 FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2001), reprinted in BLANPAIN,
supra note 124, at 214 [hereinafter FIFA RSTP (2001)].
148 Id. at 215.
149 Id. at 219–24.
150 Id. at 221.
151 Id. at 216.
152 Id.
153 Irving, supra note 146, at 717.
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Third, RSTP (2001) created a registration system that enabled FIFA and
the national associations to keep track of the transfers.154 The regulations
required that each “player wishing to play . . . in any competition organized or
recognized by a national association [be] registered with that association.”155 A
national association could only register a player from another association upon
the receipt of an international registration transfer certificate from the player’s
former association.156 Unlike the transfer certificates that were held to violate
the treaty in Bosman, issuance of an international registration transfer
certificate “may not be made subject to any conditions” or fees.157 A national
association shall not issue the certificate, however, “if a contractual dispute has
arisen in the context of the player changing clubs.”158 In this situation, the
association withholding the certificate must inform the requesting association
of the contractual dispute with the player, and the requesting association may
then request FIFA’s intervention.159
Fourth, RSTP (2001) included a section dedicated to enhancing the
protection of minors, defined as players under the age of eighteen.160 The
section had two parts. First, national associations within the EU or the
European Economic Area (“EU/EEA”) were not permitted to register minors
who were nationals of a country outside the EU/EEA.161 The only exception
was for nationals outside of the EU/EEA who moved to a country within the
EU/EEA for reasons unrelated to football.162 Second, players within the
EU/EEA territory could be traded “between the minimum working age in the
new training club’s country and the age of 18.”163 Another provision also
restricted clubs and minors from entering into a contract with a term longer
than three years.164 Therefore, a contract signed by a seventeen year-old player
could last at its longest until the player reached the age of twenty.
Finally, RSTP (2001) created the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber
(“DRC”) “to deal with disputes over compensation, sporting just cause, and

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

FIFA RSTP (2001), supra note 147, at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 219–20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226.
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mid-contract breaches.”165 This arbitration system was created “[w]ithout
prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress before a civil court
in disputes between clubs and players.”166 Additionally, “[t]he dispute
resolution system and arbitration system [was to] take account of all relevant
arrangements, laws and/or collective bargaining agreements, which exist at
national levels, as well as the specificity of sport.”167 RSTP (2001) also
provided that parties were allowed to appeal the decisions of the DRC the
Arbitration Tribunal for Football.168
Since 2002, FIFA has recognized that the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(“CAS”) exercises the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal for Football.169
The International Olympic Committee created CAS in 1983 to serve as an
international arbitration body for sports-related issues.170 CAS’s main
headquarters are in Lausanne, Switzerland, and additional courts are located in
New York City and in Sydney.171 Although CAS does not generally act as a
court of appeals, it agreed to do so for FIFA’s DRC. Under the August 2009
edition of the FIFA Statutes, FIFA empowers CAS “to resolve disputes
between FIFA, Members, Confederations, Leagues, clubs, Players, Officials
and licensed match agents and players’ agents.”172 A person must lodge an
appeal with CAS within twenty-one days of notification of a final decision
“passed by FIFA’s legal bodies . . . [or] Confederations, Members, or
Leagues.”173 The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration provisions “shall
apply to the proceedings [and] CAS shall primarily apply the various
regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.”174 Therefore, EU law does
not play a significant role in CAS’s decisions.

165

Irving, supra note 146, at 719.
FIFA RSTP (2001), supra note 147, at 230.
167 Id. at 231.
168 Id.
169 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 40.
170 Bruno Simma, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984–
2004, at 21, 21 (Ian S. Blackshaw et al. eds., 2006).
171 JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET & BRENDA KÜBLER-MABBOT, THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
AND THE OLYMPIC SYSTEM 129 (2008).
172 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 23, at 44.
173 Id. at 44.
174 Id.
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B. FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (2005)
In December 2004, FIFA revised RSTP (2001).175 FIFA explained that the
revisions were meant to clarify previous rules and create a more “userfriendly” structure.176 These new regulations entered into force on July 1,
2005.177 The new regulations were based on RSTP (2001), but made important
changes with respect to the protection of minors.178 This section focuses on
those changes and gives a brief comparison with the RSTP (2001) provisions
regarding minors. These new transfer regulations are referred to as RSTP
(2005).179
RSTP (2005) revised the regulations regarding the international transfer of
minors that were set out in RSTP (2001).180 Article 19(2) of RSTP (2005)
prohibited international transfers for all players under the age of eighteen
except for three enumerated circumstances:
(a) The player’s parents move to the country in which the New Club is
located for reasons not linked to football; or
(b) The transfer takes place within the territory of the European Union
(EU) or European Economic Area (EEA) and the player is aged
between 16 and 18 . . . ; or
(c) The player lives no further than 50km from a national border, and
the club for which the player wishes to be registered in the
neighbouring Association is also within 50km of that border. The
maximum distance between the player’s domicile and the club’s
quarters shall be 100km. In such cases, the player must continue to
live at home and the two Associations concerned must give their
explicit consent.181
RSTP (2005) set an international standard of sixteen years old as the
minimum age at which a player could transfer to another team within the
175

DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 7.
Id.
177 Id.
178 Compare supra notes 160–64, with FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS
(2005) [hereinafter FIFA RSTP (2005)], available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/
administration/50/02/49/status_transfer_en_25.pdf.
179 FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16–17.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 16. Under (b), the New Club must fulfill certain minimum obligations that involve a particular
standard of football training, education, and living. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
176
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EU/EEA.182 Under RSTP (2001), however, each country in the EU/EEA could
establish its own minimum age according to its national laws.183 RSTP (2005)
also added a provision for minors who live within fifty to one hundred
kilometers from another country’s club.184 Additionally, RSTP (2005)
continued to prohibit minors from entering contracts with a term longer than
three years.185 According to FIFA, these regulations are intended “to safeguard
the interests of young players and not hinder their progress through an
excessive tie with a club.”186
The exception allowing players between the ages of sixteen and eighteen to
transfer within the EU and the EEA is of particular importance to this
Comment and is discussed further. For now, it is important to note that clubs
that sign a player who falls into this category must meet four additional
demands to ensure a legal transfer.187 Most of these demands involve measures
to protect the children. The new club must: (1) “provide the player with an
adequate football education and/or training in line with the highest national
standards;” (2) guarantee an education “which will allow the player to pursue a
career other than football;” (3) ensure that the player “is looked after in the
best possible way” by providing housing with optimal living standards, a club
mentor, etcetera; and (4) provide its association with proof of compliance.188
These requirements are definitely a step in the right direction toward stronger
protection for minors, but is shown in Part IV that the rules are insufficient
because they have too many loopholes that clubs can use to recruit
international minors.189
C. CAS Decision Expanding FIFA RSTP (2005)
In 2008, the CAS handed down a decision stating that the exceptions
regarding the international transfer of minors under Article 19(2) of RSTP
(2005) were not exhaustive, and FIFA could add two further exceptions

182

Id.
FIFA RSTP (2001), supra note 147, at 220.
184 FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16.
185 Id. at 15.
186 FIFA, COMMENTARY ON THE REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS 53 (2006),
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer_commentary_
06_en_1843.pdf.
187 FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16.
188 Id.
189 See infra Part IV.
183

LEMBO GALLEYSFINAL

558

6/28/2011 10:46 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

regarding students.190 First, players can transfer internationally if they can
prove “without any doubt” that their reason for relocation was academic and
not athletic.191 Second, international transfers of minors are allowed if the
player’s original association and new club have a signed agreement “within the
scope of a development program for young players.”192 This second exception
must meet “certain strict conditions.”193 In a parenthetical following this
requirement, the CAS mentions “agreement on the academic and/or school
education [and] authorization granted for a limited time” as elements of the
conditions that pertain to the second exception.194 Therefore, if a club enters
into an international player exchange agreement following the certain strict
requirements, then the players may be transferred internationally without
violating Article 19 of RSTP (2005). Additionally, the CAS held that Article
19 of RSTP (2005) “applies equally to amateur and professional minor
players,”195 closing a loophole used by clubs in the past.196
D. UEFA Home-Grown Rule
In response to the influx of foreign players on European teams and the
decrease in investment in youth training academies, UEFA created new player
eligibility rules in 2005.197 UEFA hoped that these rules would protect minors
and re-nationalize and re-localize clubs.198 These player eligibility rules are
colloquially referred to as the “home-grown” rule.199 UEFA enforced these
rules in the 2006–2007 season and they are still in force as of the writing of

190 FC Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Ass’n, CAS 2008/A/1485, ¶ 7.3.3. (Ct.
Arb. Sport 2008).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. ¶ 7.2.4.
196 Id. ¶ 7.2.3. Under the FIFA RSTP (2009), “a professional is a player who has a written contract with a
club and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he effectively incurs. All other players are
considered to be amateurs.” FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 9.
197 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 21 (2006/2007)
[hereinafter UEFA REGULATIONS (2006/2007)], available at http://www.eurocups.ru/docs/cl-06_07-rules.pdf;
Lindsay Valaine Briggs, UEFA v. The European Community: Attempts of the Governing Body of European
Soccer to Circumvent EU Freedom of Movement and Antidiscrimination Labor Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439,
441 (2005).
198 Briggs, supra note 197, at 440–41.
199 UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, THE EUROPEAN CLUB FOOTBALLING LANDSCAPE: CLUB LICENSING
BENCHMARKING REPORT FINANCIAL YEAR 2009, at 29 (2009) [hereinafter CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING
REPORT].
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this Comment.200 The rules create registration regulations that require clubs to
reserve space on the roster for “locally trained players.”201 Specifically, of the
twenty-five players that can be registered to “List A,”202 four have to be locally
trained.203 “Locally trained” players are divided into two subgroups “clubtrained” players and “association-trained” players.204 A “club-trained” player is
a player of any nationality who has been registered with the current club for
three entire seasons between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one.205 An
“association-trained” player is a player of any nationality who has been
registered with a club or clubs associated with the same national association
for three entire seasons between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one.206 The
effect of this regulation is to establish a minimum quota of “home-grown”
players—players with ties to a particular team or country.207
In the 2007–2008 season, the quota increased to six locally trained players
with at least three players qualifying as “club-trained.”208 The quota increased
again for the 2008–2009 season to eight “locally-trained” players with at least
four “club-trained” players.209 The quota remained the same for the 2009–2010
season, but UEFA made slight changes regarding the age requirement.210 As
the quotas increased, the clubs’ ability to recruit foreign players diminished.

200

Id.
UEFA REGULATIONS (2006/2007), supra note 197, at 22.
202 Id.; UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 22–23 (2007/2008)
[hereinafter UEFA REGULATIONS (2007/2008)], available at http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/19071.pdf.
201

17.01 In order to be eligible to participate in the UEFA club competitions, players must be
registered with UEFA within the requested deadlines to play for a club and fulfill all the
conditions set out in the following provisions . . . .
17.02 Each club is responsible for submitting an A list of players (“List A”) and a B list of
players (“List B”), duly signed, to its national association for verification, validation and
forwarding to UEFA.
Id.
203

UEFA REGULATIONS (2006/2007), supra note 197, at 22.
Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 199, at 29.
208 UEFA REGULATIONS (2007/2008), supra note 202, at 23.
209 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 22 (2008/2009),
available
at
http://www.uefa.com/multimediafiles/download/regulations/uefa/others/70/22/60/702260_
download.pdf.
210 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 25 (2009/2010),
available at http://www.uefa.com/multimediafiles/download/competitions/UCL/88/61/44/886144_download.
pdf.
204
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Due to this difficulty of manning rosters with top players under the constraints
of the home-grown rule, some teams could not compete at prior levels.211
Proponents of the home-grown rule believe that it will help decrease the
financial disparity and competitive imbalance between football teams.212 Other
supporters of the rule, such as Richard Scudamore, the chief executive of the
Premier League,213 believe that the rule will “give clubs an extra incentive to
invest in youth.”214 Scudamore denies that the rule will give clubs incentives to
hoard young foreign players.215 Proponents also believe that the rule will stop
clubs from spending so much money on outside talent, encouraging investment
in home-grown talent instead.216 These arguments, however, are not persuasive
and are flawed. First, clubs continue to have an incentive to recruit abroad.
While the club’s home country may produce top players, a club cannot rely on
what is only a possibility. Therefore, to be sure that they can meet the homegrown quota, clubs must recruit promising foreign players while they are still
young enough to meet the registration requirement of three seasons between
the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. Second, the rule may not re-nationalize
teams. Home-grown does not mean citizen. In fact, under the home-grown rule,
a club could meet the home-grown quota with a team comprised wholly of
foreign players.
A more pressing issue, however, is whether the quotas accord with EU
laws regarding the free movement of workers.217 As discussed earlier, the
Bosman case held that UEFA’s rule requiring quotas for national players was
incompatible with European Community law.218 As argued in the Bosman
case, however, proponents of nationality restrictions believe that the court

211 For example, manager of the Liverpool club, Rafael Benítez, opposes the adoption of the eight homegrown player quota and believes that the league should focus on quality, not quantity. Andy Hunter, Rafael
Benítez Hits Out at Home-Grown Ruling for Missing the Point, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 16, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/sep/16/liverpool-rafael-benitez-homegrown.
212 ARNAUT, supra note 37, at 48–49.
213 See supra note 129.
214 Premier League Announce Home-grown Quota, FIFA.COM (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/
worldfootball/clubfootball/news/newsid=1101646.html.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 UEFA ‘Home-Grown Player’ Rule May End Up in Court, Says EU Law Professor, EURACTIVE (June
3,
2005),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/sports/uefa-home-grown-player-rule-may-court-eu-law-professor/
article-139418.
218 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I5040, I-5078.
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should allow exceptions for sporting associations.219 Nevertheless, outside of
specific competitions based on nationality,220 the ECJ has yet to make
exceptions when applying free movement and anti-discrimination laws to
sporting regulations.
IV. GETTING AROUND THE FIFA REGULATIONS: LOOPHOLES USED BY
EUROPEAN CLUBS TO OBTAIN MINORS
Now that the UEFA home-grown player quota has increased to eight,221
clubs have a greater incentive to seek out young international talent to enroll in
their local training academies because these players can be counted in a club’s
home-grown quota. Clubs also seek out young talent because the younger
players are generally less expensive, which allows clubs to profit significantly.
Younger players and foreign players come at a lower purchase price,222 which
allows clubs to make a significant profit if the players go on to have a
successful professional career.223 For example, in 2003, Arsenal picked up
Cesc Fàbregas when he was sixteen on a free transfer from the Barcelona
youth team.224 In 2009 he was valued at £25 million.225 Therefore, European
clubs have an incentive to purchase players at a young age so they can meet
their home-grown quotas and make a profit if the player decides to transfer
when he is eligible to sign a professional contract. Even if just one or two of
these young players succeed professionally, clubs will reap the benefits.226
This encourages clubs to find as many loopholes as possible in the FIFA
regulations regarding the transfer of minors and to exploit those loopholes for
commercial benefit. Investigative reporters have even found that the big clubs
have spent large sums of money to find these loopholes and to see just how far
219 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, at I-4974, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de
Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040. For example, the UEFA argued that transfer rules were
needed to “maintain financial and competitive equilibrium” in football, and to “support the cultivation of talent
in youth and development schemes.” P.E. Morris, S. Morrow & P.M. Spink, EC Law and Professional
Football: Bosman and Its Implications, 59 MOD. L. REV. 893, 895 (1996).
220 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5076.
221 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., Mike Norrish, Arsene Wenger’s Top Five Arsenal Signings, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 22, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/leagues/premierleague/arsenal/5200319/Arsene-Wengers-top-fiveArsenal-signings.html (describing a number of bargain player acquisitions by Arsenal).
223 See The Big Question: As the Football Transfer Window Closes, Is Spending Out of Control?,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/the-bigquestion-as-the-football-transfer-window-closes-is-spending-out-of-control-915623.html.
224 Norrish, supra note 222.
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
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they can push the envelope.227 When it comes down to it, European football is
a commercialized sport and clubs will seemingly do anything to make a higher
profit, even if that means risking the well-being of children.228 This Part
discusses three ways European clubs circumvent the transfer regulations to
obtain these minors.
First, many clubs use the exception under Article 19(2)(a), which allows
minors under the age of eighteen to transfer internationally if the child’s
parents move to the country for “reasons not linked to football.”229 Clubs have
resorted to creating local jobs for parents and even bribing them so that their
children can register with the club in accordance with the FIFA regulations.230
Two Norwegian reporters, Madsen and Johansson, who conducted an
investigation of the unspoken and often illegal practices of European clubs
regarding the transfer of minors, found agents and clubs who admitted to
offering parents jobs.231 One father was given a position as a gardener in the
stadium; another as the team bus driver.232
Second, clubs are obtaining young players through exchange agreements
with clubs in Africa and countries in the EU with flexible visa and immigration
policies.233 According to CAS’s decision in 2009,234 minors can transfer
internationally if their current club has an exchange agreement with the foreign
club.235 The exchange agreement, however, must be “within the scope of a
development program for young players” and meet certain requirements.236 For
example, the exchange agreement must contain specific information regarding
the minor’s academic education.237 Dutch clubs Ajax and Feyenoord operate

227 See generally LARS BACKE MADSEN & JENS M. JOHANSSON, DEN FORSVUNNE DIAMANTEN [The Lost
Diamond] (2008).
228 See, e.g., Kay Jay, Talent Spotting or Child Trafficking?, YOUTH.SG (Sept. 17, 2009), http://app.youth.
sg/Home/Articles/tabid/94/id/709/cid/0/Default.aspx.
229 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 19–20.
230 For example, Manchester United allegedly offered Paul Pogba’s parents €100,000 each and a house so
that their son would transfer from France. Manchester United Paid Paul Pogba’s Parents, Le Havre President
Alleges, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/sep/07/paul-pogbamanchester-united.
231 See MADSEN & JOHANSSON, supra note 227.
232 See id.
233 See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
234 Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Ass’n, CAS 2008/A/1485, ¶ 7.3.3. (Ct. Arb.
Sport 2008); see supra Part III.C.
235 CAS 2008/A/1485, FC Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Ass’n, ¶ 7.3.3.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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training academies in Ghana,238 and “French clubs such as Paris Saint-Germain
and Monaco . . . maintain scouting networks in the region.”239 European clubs
are not only using these loopholes to secure players in Africa, but all over the
world. Even a sixteen-year-old American-born player, whose grandfather lives
in Italy, worked to obtain an EU passport so he could play with the English
club, West Ham United.240
Unfortunately, the demand for inexpensive young players has also resulted
in an influx of unregistered training academies241 and unlicensed agents who
take advantage of minors who play football, particularly in Africa.242 Seeing
the top African players, such as Dider Drogba and Samuel Etò, on European
teams, gives young African players hopes and dreams of success in Europe,243
making it easy for these agents to lure them there with false hopes of becoming
a star footballer.244 Parents pay these fake agents with what little money they
have to send their children to Europe,245 but more often than not the young
boys never register with an academy.246 If the boys do not register, many
agents abandon them in Europe without a European passport or money to
purchase a plane ticket back home.247 That these players are so inexpensive
compared to European players means that the agents can recruit many players
at once.248 Moussa N’diayè, a Senegalese football player, commented on the
problem noting that “[i]t is always worth sending 100 [African players to
Europe]—the agent can make money from the one or two who make it. The
238

DAVID GOLDBLATT, THE BALL IS ROUND: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF SOCCER 715 (2008); see also Dan
McDougall, The Scandal of Africa’s Trafficked Players, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jan/06/newsstory.sport4.
239 McDougall, supra note 238.
240 Noah Davis, Davis’ Discussions: Sebastian Lletget Leaves, GOAL.COM (May 29, 2009, 6:04:57 AM),
http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/66/united-states/2009/05/29/1292893/davis-discussions-sebastian-lletgetleaves. The one benefit of these European operated training academies is that the boys who attend receive
proper education and training. McDougall, supra note 238. Parents will pay money for their children to attend
these “training academies,” even though they are not proper training facilities. Id.
241 McDougall, supra note 238.
242 GOLDBLATT, supra note 238, at 701.
243 Colin Brown, Football Chiefs to Tackle Hidden Trade in Africa’s Children, INDEPENDENT (July 5,
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/football-chiefs-to-tackle-hidden-tradein-africas-children-860504.html.
244 Id.; see also, GOLDBLATT, supra note 238, at 701.
245 McDougall, supra note 238 (“There is now a huge business to be made from football, says Mbvoumin,
and it feeds on people’s dreams of a better life for their family. ‘In Africa, when an important man tells a
family their son has talent, that family will do everything to raise the money to send that boy to the West, sell
their house, their youngest sons, their life away.’”).
246 GOLDBLATT, supra note 238, at 701.
247 Id.
248 Brown, supra note 243.
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other 98 are forgotten.”249 Belgian senator, Jean-Marie Dedecker, conducted an
investigation and found “422 cases of illegal trade with Nigerian players in
Belgium alone.”250
Finally, certain European clubs benefit due to differences in contract law
throughout the EU and differences in the national associations’ rules regarding
the age minors can sign professional contracts.251 For example, the Italian
Football Federation, Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio, prohibits players from
signing professional club contracts until they are 18.252 In Britain, however,
“[p]layers from European Union countries are able to move to Britain on
academy or scholarship contracts at 16, and to sign full professional contracts
at 17.”253 Due to these limitations, many sixteen-year-old Italian boys have
joined English clubs.254 In 2009, sixteen-year-old Federico Macheda left the
Italian club, SS Lazio, to play for Manchester United.255 The Lazio President
tried everything he could to keep Macheda on the team, but it was impossible
for him to compete with an offer for a professional contract.256
Clubs also try to sign young players to commitment contracts so that once
they reach the professional age they have to play for that club.257 In 2008,
when Jeremy Helan, a seventeen-year-old player for the French club, Rennes,
joined the English club, Manchester City,258 FIFA began an investigation to
determine whether there was a violation of the RSTP involving an inducement

249

Id.
Kasper Lindberg, The Man Who Traced 422 Soccer Slaves, PLAY GAME MAG. (2006) http://www.
playthegame.org/upload/Magazine%202005/themanwhotraced442slaves.pdf.
251 See Rob Draper, Premier League’s Big Four Accused of Plundering Europe’s Finest Teenagers, MAIL
ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.in.com/news/sports/fullstory-premier-leagues-big-fouraccused-of-plundering-europes-finest-teenagers-10690489-473c0b4ef57f13eec5e462dc84e5af10cfbadfc01.html.
252 Raelin MacGrevy, The Final Word on Federico Macheda, SOCCERLENS (Apr. 16, 2009), http://
soccerlens.com/the-final-word-on-federico-macheda/26785.
253 Nick Szczepanik, Lazio President’s Frustration After Federico Macheda Gets Away, TIMES ONLINE
(Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/premier_league/manchester_united/
article6047959.ece.
254 See Draper, supra note 251.
255 Inside World Soccer, Lazio Rue Macheda Transfer, INSIDE WORLD SOCCER (Apr. 6, 2009),
http://www.insideworldsoccer.com/2009/04/lazio-rues-macheda-transfer.html.
256 Id.
257 See, e.g., Johnny Crossan, The Transfer of Minors: A Euro Problem?, VITAL CITY http://www.
manchestercity.vitalfootball.co.uk/article.asp?a=170202 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (discussing the French use
of the Pre-Contract Agreement).
258 Rob Harris, FIFA Investigates Man City’s Signing of Teen Helan, AJC.COM (Sept. 8, 2009, 7:01 AM),
http://www.ajc.com/sports/fifa-investigates-man-citys-133454.html.
250
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to breach a contract.259 Helan signed a contract with Rennes at the age of
thirteen, which stated that if he played for the French team while at the youth
academy he would be obligated to sign a two-year professional contract with
the team in the future.260 Helan has brought a case against the club in the
French Labor Courts stating that the contract that he originally signed with
Rennes is voidable under French law.261 As of the writing of this Comment,
Helan’s action is pending.262
A similar contractual dispute occurred with player Gaël Kakuta. Kakuta,
who was a French national under contract with the French club Lens left to
play with the English club Chelsea in 2007.263 On August 27, 2009, the DRC
issued a decision regarding the contractual dispute over the international
transfer of the minor player.264 The DRC found that Kakuta breached his
contract and that Chelsea induced the breach.265 According to the Lens
chairman, Gervais Martel, the decision was not surprising.266 Chelsea started
contacting Kakuta before he was sixteen, and the French club had nurtured him
since he was eight-and-a-half.267 The DRC decided that Kakuta must pay
compensation of €780,000 and that Chelsea is jointly and severally liable for
that compensation.268 In addition, the DRC ordered Chelsea to pay Lens a
training compensation of €130,000.269 The DRC also placed a four-month
restriction on Kakuta’s eligibility to play in official matches and placed a twoyear transfer ban on Chelsea.270 Therefore, FIFA’s decision on Kakuta implies
that the DRC believes that contracts with minors are enforceable. As of the
writing of this Comment, Chelsea has appealed the DRC’s decision to CAS,
and CAS has granted a stay of the sanctions until it decides the case.271
259

Id.
See id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Owen Gibson, Chelsea Banned by FIFA from Signing Players till 2011 Over Gaël Kakuta,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 3, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/sep/03/chelsea-fifatransfer-ban-gael-kakuta.
264 Kakuta: DCR Decision Reached, FIFA.COM (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/
administration/news/newsid=1097777.html; Gibson, supra note 263.
265 Kakuta: DCR Decision Reached, FIFA.COM (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/
administration/news/newsid=1097777.html.
266 Gibson, supra note 263.
267 Id.
268 Kakuta: DCR Decision Reached, supra note 264.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Richard Williams, Player Contracts: Inducement to Breach Contract: Gael Kakuta Case, WORLD
SPORTS L. REP., Dec. 2009, http://www.e-comlaw.com/wslr/details_contents.asp?ID=1184.
260
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V. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM CLUBS’ EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MINORS
Although European clubs’ use of loopholes allows them to act within the
FIFA regulations regarding the transfer of minors, many of the actions may
violate international and European law. This Part first focuses on immigration
law issues regarding third-country nationals272 throughout the EU and the free
movement of workers within the EU.273 It then discusses international and
European organizations and treaties dedicated to protect minors and eliminate
trafficking in human beings.274 Finally, this Part gives an overview of the
enforceability of contracts with minors in several countries in the EU.275
A. Immigration and Migration Laws in the European Union
1. Immigration of Third-Country Nationals
As of the writing of this Comment, the EU does not have common
immigration laws for third-country nationals, meaning persons who do not
have citizenship within the EU.276 Accordingly, each member state has its own
rules for granting visas, residence permits, and citizenship.277 All member
states grant short-term visas, which are defined in EU legislation as visas that
are for a duration of less than three months.278 The general regulation of the
member states’ short-term visas falls under the EU authority,279 with the
exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, which are exempt

272

A third-country national is defined in this Comment as a person who is a citizen of a country outside of

the EU.
273

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
275 See infra Part V.C.
276 Int’l Org. for Migration, Comparative Study of the Laws in the 27 EU Member States for Legal
Immigration, at 45, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 393.281 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter EU Immigration Study]. The study
was commissioned by the European Parliament. Id. at 9. But see TFEU art. 79(1) (“The Union shall develop a
common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair
treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.”).
277 See EU Immigration Study, supra note 276, at 28–29.
278 Id. at 30. More specifically, EU legislation defines a short-term visa as follows:
274

an authorization issued by a Member State or a decision taken by such State which is required
with a view to: entry for an intended stay in that Member State or in several Member States of no
more than three months in total; entry for transit through the territory of that Member State or
several Member States, except for transit at an airport.
Id. (quoting Council Regulation 539/2001, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 81) 1, 5 (EC)).
279 Id.

LEMBO GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:46 AM

FIFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS

567

from the EU visa regulations due to certain opt-out provisions.280 Long-term
visas are for a duration over three months.281 Only about one-third of the
member states grant long-term visas,282 and these visas are generally a
condition to present in-country residence permit applications.283
When granting visas, the member states generally look to the third-country
national’s purpose for entry to determine what type of visa is needed and
whether it should be granted.284 Therefore, the member states have different
categories of immigration that correspond with the various reasons thirdcountry immigrants move to host states.285 One category for admission listed
by many member states is persons of a specific profession.286 Within this
category, the member states often include specific provisions for athletes and
coaches,287 which make certain states more attractive to third-country nationals
wishing to play in Europe.
Some states have fewer requirements for athletes while others do not have a
similar specialized category and require athletes to follow standard procedures
for entry. In the United Kingdom, work permits are only given to
internationally distinguished football players.288 Specifically, “[a] player must
have played in 75 percent of his country’s competitive ‘A’ national team
matches over the past two years and he has to be coming from a country that
ranks in the top 70 of FIFA rankings.”289 If the permit is denied, the
contracting club can file a petition and deposit a fee to have a six-person board
review the case and issue a final decision.290 In Sweden, the Swedish Sports
Federation reviews all professional athletes’ applications for work permits.291
It “must approve the contract and certify that the employment of the applicant
sports-person is of particular importance for the development of that particular

280

Id.
Id.
282 These member states include: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Romania, and Slovenia. Id.
283 Accordingly these visas are sometimes called “immigration visas.” Id.
284 Id. at 28.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Deanna Reiss, The Immigration Puzzle: Understanding U.S. and European Athlete Immigration Rules,
26 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 6, 7 (2008) (“The Home Office has made a special deal with the governing bodies of
many professional sports, including the Football Association.”).
289 Id. at 7–8.
290 Id. at 8.
291 Id.
281
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branch of sport.”292 The fact that each member state has its own application
process and method to review visas and work permits for professional athletes
makes it very hard to regulate the entry of foreign athletes in the EU.
2. Free Movement of Workers
The EU institutions have authority over the movement of workers within
the EU.293 As discussed in Part III.B regarding the Bosman case, the member
states cannot impose restrictions on free movement of workers. FIFA and
UEFA have argued for a sporting exception to the rule, but the ECJ and other
EU institutions have yet to yield and allow exceptions.294
In 2005, the ECJ confirmed and expanded the ruling in Bosman in
Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura.295 Simutenkov, a Russian
national who played football for a Spanish club, had a Spanish residence and a
legal work permit.296 The Spanish Federation had a licensing system in place
where players either held a non-Community or a Community license based on
whether they were nationals of the EU/EEA.297 Clubs limited the number of
non-Community licensed players allowed to play in national matches.298
Simutenkov could not obtain a Community license and sued the team for
violating an anti-discrimination provision of a partnership agreement between
Russia and the EU.299 The ECJ held that anti-discrimination rules apply to
foreign nationals who are legally employed in the EU through agreements with
the EU.300 Therefore, any athlete who is a national of a country that has a
partnership agreement with the EU and is legally employed in the EU is given
the same rights as EU nationals, including the fundamental right of freedom of
movement for workers.301

292

Id.
See TFEU art. 45.
294 See supra Parts II–III.
295 Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 2005 E.C.R. I-2596.
296 Id. at I-2600.
297 Id. at I-2600–01.
298 Id. at I-2601.
299 Id.
300 Id. at I-2610–11.
301 Steven Stewart, The Development of Sports Law in the European Union, Its Globalisation, and the
Competition Law Aspects of European Sports Broadcasting Rights, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 183, 196 (2009).
293
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B. Child Labor and Human Trafficking
Not all players enter the EU legally. Unfortunately, many unnecessary
unlicensed agents bring young African players to Europe through illegal
means: some children are brought over in boats,302 some children obtain
limited visas for travel purposes, and sometimes embassy employees issue
passports that raise the player’s age for bribes.303 If these young boys are not
selected for a European team, they are often left without legal papers and no
way back home.304 Many boys end up working on the streets selling fake
purses and souvenirs to tourists.305 Countries throughout the world
acknowledge that child labor and trafficking of human beings are gross
violations of human rights by signing treaties to prevent them.306 Accordingly,
several international organizations are dedicated to solving these problems,
including the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), the International
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (“IPEC”), and the International
Organization of Migration (“IOM”). This Part gives an overview of the
international and European treaties and organizations dedicated to protecting
human rights.
1. Child Labor and Human Trafficking in an International Context
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) was
the first United Nations (“UN”) treaty to comprehensively address child
labor.307 The CRC entered into force in 1990 with 140 signatories and 193
parties.308 The CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age of
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
302 In May 2007, an abandoned fishing trawler was found washed up on the shore of the Canary Islands in
Spain with a cargo of 130 young African men. Dan McDougall, The Scandal of Africa’s Trafficked Players,
OBSERVER (London), Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jan/06/newsstory.sport4. There
were fifteen teenagers on board who believed that they were going to play for Marseille or Real Madrid. Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182]; United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 15, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
307 Alessandro Fodella, Freedom from Child Labour as a Human Right: The Role of the UN System in
Implementing ILO Child Labour Standards, in CHILD LABOUR IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 203, 209 (Giuseppe
Nesi et al. eds., 2008).
308 United Nations, Status of Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 29, 2011, 12:03 PM),
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en.
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earlier.”309 The CRC provides for states parties to protect children from
“economic exploitation” and “any work that is likely to be hazardous or to
interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”310
Certain UN agencies have a goal of ensuring these rights for children and
developing further protections. The ILO is an agency of the UN that works to
promote certain international labor standards.311 Each year members of the ILO
meet in Geneva at the International Labour Conference to establish and adopt
international labor standards.312 In 1992, the ILO formed the IPEC—currently
the largest program in the ILO—to progressively eliminate child labor in
accordance with the CRC.313 A main priority for IPEC is to eliminate the worst
forms of child labor, which are set out in the ILO Convention No. 182.314
According to Convention No. 182, which has been ratified by 173 nations as of
February 21, 2011,315 the worst forms of child labor include, among other
things: “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and
trafficking of children.”316 Unfortunately, ILO Convention No. 182 does not
specifically define child trafficking,317 which creates problems with
implementation and regulation.

309

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 306, at 46.
Id. at 54.
311 About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2011).
312 About the ILC, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ilc/AbouttheILC/lang--en/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2011).
313 JULIE A. MERTUS, UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE FOR A NEW ERA 159 (2005).
314 The Programme, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ipec/programme/lang--en/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2011).
315 List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
1999 (No. 182), INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Feb. 26, 2011), http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/applis/applbyconv.cfm?conv=C182&hdroff=1&lang=EN.
316 ILO Convention No. 182, supra note 306.
317 ILO Convention No. 182 does, however, reference “practices similar to slavery,” which are defined in
the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery (1956) as
310

“any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of eighteen years, is
delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for
reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.”
See Borderline Slavery, 15 HUM. RTS. WATCH 44 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/togo0403.pdf (quoting Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to the Slavery art. 1(d), Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3).
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Other organizations, such as the IOM, an intergovernmental organization
developed to ensure and promote “humane and orderly migration” throughout
the world,318 have developed definitions of trafficking. According to a bulletin
written by the IOM, “[h]uman trafficking . . . is a new form of slavery that
involves three stages: recruitment, transportation, and exploitation.”319 The
IOM started its involvement in counter-trafficking in 1994.320 Since then, the
IOM “has implemented almost 500 projects in 85 countries, and has provided
assistance to approximately 15,000 trafficked persons.”321 In 2007, the IOM
assisted thirty-four young football players back to their homes in Abidjan from
Mali.322 The group of sixteen- to eighteen-year-old boys was apparently
smuggled into Mali by an unscrupulous agent who collected $600 from their
parents and promised a European football career for the boys.323 Although
these young boys’ dreams to become European football players were shattered,
the IOM protected these boys from living alone in the streets of Europe and
brought them back home to their families.324
2. Child Labor and Human Trafficking in an EU Context
The EU has also recognized the problems of illegal immigration, human
trafficking, and child labor within the EU.325 In 2005, the Council of Europe
addressed the need to implement a plan to fight human trafficking in the EU,326
in accordance with the Hague Programme.327 The Council noted that to

318 About IOM, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/lang/en (last
visited Mar. 5, 2010) (“With 132 member states, a further seventeen states holding observer status and offices
in over 100 countries, IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all. It
does so by providing services and advice to governments and migrants.”).
319 Human Trafficking vs Human Smuggling, 15 EYE ON HUM. TRAFFICKING 4, 4 (2007).
320 Counter-Trafficking, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/748 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2011).
321 Id.
322 Footballers’ Dreams of Fame in Europe Shattered, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Mar. 27, 2007),
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAF/cache/offonce?entryId=13514; see also Ivorian Adolescents Tricked by
Football Agent, AFROL NEWS, http://www.afrol.com/articles/24863 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
323 Footballers’ Dreams of Fame in Europe Shattered, supra note 322.
324 Id.
325 See, e.g., EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for Combating and Preventing
Trafficking in Human Beings, 2005 O.J. (C 311) 1, 1 [hereinafter EU Plan on Best Practices].
326 Id.
327 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 1, 25 (Nov. 4–5, 2004). The Hague Programme
lists ten priorities for the European Union in order to strengthen freedom, security, and justice in the five years
following its passage. The Hague Programme: 10 Priorities for the Next Five Years, EUROPA (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l16002_en.
htm.
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effectively combat “human trafficking an integrated approach is needed,
having as its basis the respect of human rights and taking into account its
global nature.”328 Additionally, Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union states: “The Union shall develop a common immigration
policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration
flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in member
states, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal
immigration and trafficking in human beings.”329 TFEU also states that “the
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure, shall adopt measures . . . [to] combat[] trafficking in
persons, in particular women and children.”330
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“Charter”),331
which was given full legal effect in 2009,332 also addresses the issue of human
trafficking by simply stating that “[t]rafficking in human beings is
prohibited.”333 The Charter is meant to ensure that EU regulations and
directives do not contradict the European Convention of Human Rights.334 The
Charter also covers several areas relating to children’s rights.335 Article 32
covers the “[p]rohibition of child labour and protection of young people at
work.”336 Under this Article, “[t]he minimum age of admission to employment
328

EU Plan on Best Practices, supra note 325, at 1.
TFEU art 77.
330 Id.
331 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007 O.J. (C 301) 1, 1 [hereinafter EU Rights
Charter].
332 The Charter of Fundamental Rights was first drafted in 2000. See id. At that time, the Charter was only
given declarative status, meaning a symbolic non-legally binding status, under the Nice Treaty in 2001.
MAURICE ROCHE, EXPLORING THE SOCIOLOGY OF EUROPE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL COMPLEX
202 (2010).
333 EU Rights Charter, supra note 331, at 3.
334 THEODŌROS D. SAKELLAROPOULOS ET AL., CONNECTING WELFARE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL MODEL 206 (2004).
335 Holly Cullen, Children’s Rights, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: POLITICS, LAW AND
POLICY 323, 323 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004).
336 Article 32 of the Charter reads as follows:
329

The employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment may
not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be
more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations.
Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be
protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or
physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education.
EU Rights Charter, supra note 331, at 7.
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may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age.”337 Currently,
member states in the EU do not have a uniform minimum school-leaving
age.338 Furthermore, Article 24, which covers general children’s rights, states:
“In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or
private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary
consideration.”339 Under this Article, UEFA’s home-grown rule might be
suspect. It does not seem that the children’s interests were a primary
consideration in UEFA’s promulgation of the home-grown rule. As seen in
Part IV, the rule has encouraged clubs to recruit young players from all across
Europe. This might lead the player to change schools and location and
negatively impact the child’s health and education.340
C. Enforceability of Minors’ Contracts Under European Law
The conflict of law between FIFA and member states of the EU is further
complicated by the fact that no uniform legislation exists regarding substantive
contract provisions in the EU.341 This explains why Helan is currently fighting
in the French courts to prove that the contract he signed with his former French
team as a thirteen-year-old is not enforceable against him.342 It is important to
review the rules regarding the enforceability of minors’ contracts at a national
level because the DRC must take into account the rules governing each dispute
at a national level.343
The member states’ jurisdictional differences regarding the enforceability
of contracts with minors can be divided into three general categories: some
countries only enforce the contracts if they are made with parental consent;
others enforce contracts if they are for the overall benefit of the minor; and a
337

Id.
ANNE SONNET, JOBS FOR YOUTH: FRANCE 89 (2009); see also At What Age . . . ? Comparative Table,
RIGHT TO EDUC., http://www.right-to-education.org/node/279 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
339 EU Rights Charter, supra note 331, at 7.
340 See DAVID, supra note 136, at 33–35, 186–88.
341 The only legislation is a default rule regarding choice-of-law rules. See Regulation 593/2008 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
O.J. (L 177) (EC).
342 See supra notes 257–62 and accompanying text.
343 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 26.
338

The Players’ Status Committee, the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the single judge or the DRC
judge (as the case may be) shall, when taking their decisions, apply these regulations whilst
taking into account all relevant arrangements, laws and/or collective bargaining agreements that
exist at national level, as well as the specificity of sport.
Id.
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few countries do not enforce contracts with minors at all. Regardless of the
approach, the public policy of protecting children is the key underlying
influence. This policy comes in conflict with the realities of the business world
when the people contracting with minors want assurances that the contracts are
enforceable. This Subpart gives a brief overview of these laws.
In Germany, minors have limited legal capacity from the ages of seven to
eighteen.344 Minors can enter into binding contracts only with the consent of
their parents.345 Very few exceptions to this rule exist.346 To determine the
validity of a contract, judges focus only on whether the child had explicit or
inferable consent from his parent or guardian to enter into the contract.347 The
judges do not evaluate the utility of the contract or the benefits granted to the
minor.348 Austrian code regarding the contractual capacity of minors349 is very
similar to the German law.350
These laws tend to ignore the idea that minors should be able to pursue
their own interests and create a complete constraint on minors who do not
receive consent from their legal guardians.351 The law also ignores the interests
of third parties who would benefit by being able to rely on the enforceability of
contracts with the minor.352 In turn, this may decrease the protection of
commerce.353 A person will probably not contract with a minor without the
consent of his parents, which may leave certain markets in commerce
unfulfilled. On the other hand, if the person contracting with the minor does
obtain parental consent, he can rely on the enforceability of the contract.
In an attempt to promote commerce with minors and protect them from
potential disadvantages, some countries enforce contracts that are beneficial
for the minor. The common law rule in the United Kingdom is that contracts
made with minors are binding if the contract benefits the minor overall.354 The
344 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 105–07, translated in RAYMOND YOUNGS,
SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAW 235–38 (Cavendish Publ’g Ltd. 2d ed. 2002) (1994) (containing the English
translation).
345 HEIN KÖTZ & AXEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 101 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1992).
346 Id.
347 Id. at 102.
348 Id.
349 Id. at 101.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 102.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 101.
354 G.H. TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 215 (Butterworths 5th ed. 1995) (1962).
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court decides whether the contract is beneficial and may look at surrounding
circumstances.355 These principles have been used to determine the validity of
professional contracts entered into by minors who are athletes and
entertainers.356 The rule that binds beneficial contracts with minors, however,
creates problems because enforceability of the contracts is determined on a
case-by-case basis. In turn, this may make agents wary of contracting with
minor athletes.
In 2006, the Chancery Division of Manchester heard a case regarding a
young football player, Wayne Rooney, and his decision to rescind a
representation agreement and enter into a new agreement.357 The court held
that Rooney could break the contract with his original agent because it was not
to his advantage taken as a whole.358 Rooney was already a “footballing
phenomenon”359 and had contracted with a professional team, so he did not
have a need for representation.360 Therefore, he could disaffirm his first
representation contract and enter into a new one. The court implied, however,
that Rooney could not disaffirm his contract with his current soccer team
because it was for his benefit overall.361
VI. FIFA’S SOLUTION: 2009 REGULATIONS
FIFA and UEFA are aware of the strategies that clubs use to circumvent the
transfer regulations and recruit minors. UEFA President, Michel Platini, gave a
speech to the European Parliament in which he raised the issue of exploiting
child labor in football and stated that “[p]aying a child to kick a ball is not that
different from paying a child to work on a production line.”362 He also
addressed the problem of child trafficking.363 Accordingly, FIFA made many
amendments to RSTP (2005) in 2009 that focus on the protection of minors.364

355

G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 503 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 10th ed. 1999) (1962).
Id.
357 Proform Sports Mgmt. Ltd. v. Proactive Sports Mgmt. Ltd. & Another, [2006] EWHC 2903 (Ch),
[2007] Bus. L.R. 93.
358 Id. at 106.
359 Id. at 94.
360 Id. at 105.
361 Id.
362 UEFA President Urges Protection of Football’s Values, UEFA.COM (Feb. 22, 2009, 7:10 AM),
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisation/president/news/newsid=801478.html.
363 Id.
364 Circular No. 1190: Revised Regulations on the Status of Transfers of Players–Protection of Minors,
supra note 144.
356
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This Part discusses these amendments and analyzes the potential problems of
the new regulations.
A. FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (2009)
In October 2009, FIFA implemented the newest Regulations for the Status
and Transfer of Players. According to FIFA Circular No. 1190, the vast
majority of the amendments “relate to the protection of minors as well as of the
clubs investing in the training and education of young players.”365 RSTP
(2009) defines a minor as “a player who has not yet reached the age of 18.”366
Articles 19(1) and (2) of RSTP (2009) are the same as Articles 19(1) and (2) of
RSTP (2005), generally prohibiting international transfers for players under the
age of eighteen and including three exceptions.367 The regulations also now
apply to “any player who has never been previously registered with a club and
is not a national of the country in which he wishes to be registered for the first
time.”368 More importantly, FIFA added Article 19(4), which requires the
Players’ Status Committee369 to appoint a subcommittee to examine and
approve or reject each international transfer of a minor player.370 The
subcommittee also oversees every registration of a minor “who has never
previously been registered with a club and is not a national of the country in
which he wishes to be registered for the first time.”371 This review is limited to
players between the ages of twelve and eighteen, however, because under
Article 9(2) “an [International Transfer Certificate] is not required for a player
under the age of 12.”372
RSTP (2009) also added Article 19(bis), which covers the registration and
reporting of minors at academies.373 Under this provision, “[c]lubs that operate

365

Id.
FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 6.
367 Id. at 20; FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16.
368 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 20.
369 FIFA Players’ Status Committee, FRONTROW LEGAL, www.frontrowlegal.com/services/playerscoaches-and-managers/fifa-players-status-committee (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (“The FIFA Players’ Status
Committee is a tribunal administrated from FIFA Headquarters in Zurich which, as the title suggests,
adjudicates on the status of players. It follows a typical format similar to that of court proceedings where the
parties have the right to be heard, the right to present evidence and the right to inspect evidence leading to a
decision.”).
370 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, art. 19(4).
371 Id. at 20.
372 Id. at 19–20.
373 Id. at 21. Under RSTP (2009), academy means “an organisation or an independent legal entity whose
primary, long-term objective is to provide players with long-term training through the provision of the
366

LEMBO GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:46 AM

FIFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS

577

an academy with legal, financial or de facto links to the club are obliged to
report all minors who attend the academy to the association upon whose
territory the academy operates.”374 The national association must oversee all
the academies that are not linked to a club and requires them to report all
minors.375 Each association must also “keep a register comprising the names
and dates of birth of the minors who have been reported to it by the clubs or
academies.”376
B. Problems with RSTP (2009)
As of the writing of this Comment, it has yet to be shown whether these
changes have been effective in protecting minors. Ideally, the new provisions
covering the registration of minors in academies will prevent the trafficking of
minors by monitoring each association’s register.377 Unfortunately, however, it
seems as though it will be difficult to keep these lists accurate in African
countries in the midst of the child trafficking problem due to the large amounts
of unaccredited academies. In Ghana, approximately 500 illegal academies are
operating in the city of Accra alone, and thousands more are spread across the
country.378 Therefore, it is seemingly impossible for Ghana’s national
association to meet its responsibility of keeping track of all the minors enrolled
in the many unaccredited training academies.
Another potential problem may evolve from the fact that the subcommittee
is only responsible for overseeing the international movement of players
between the age of twelve and eighteen.379 This creates a very real concern for
children under the age of twelve. In September 2009, Barcelona utilized this
loophole in the minor international transfer system when the club signed a
seven-year-old French boy, enrolling him in its training academy.380
Additionally, these rules only pertain to international transfers. Therefore, the
necessary training facilities and infrastructure. This shall primarily include, but not be limited to, football
training centres, football camps, football schools, etc.” Id. at 6.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 See id.
378 Dan McDougall, The Scandal of Africa’s Trafficked Players, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 6, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jan/06/newsstory.sport4.
379 New Regulations for the International Transfer and First Registration of Players Under the Age of 18,
GLOUCESTERSHIRE COUNTY FA (Nov. 16, 2009, 4:13 PM), http://www.gloucestershirefa.com/News/2009/11/
NewRegulationsForTheInternationalTransferAndFirstRegistrationOfPlayersUnderTheAgeOf18.htm.
380 Brian Lofrumento, Barca Sign a 7 Year Old? You Must Be Joking, PREMIERSHIP TALK (Sept. 17,
2009), http://www.premiershiptalk.com/2009/09/17/barca-sign-a-7-year-old-you-must-be-joking.
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trading and movement of young players between clubs within the same
national association could still pose problems. For example, seven-year-old
Harry Yates’s parents agreed to sign with Everton, an English club that had
been competing with Manchester United and Liverpool to enroll the boy in its
training academy.381 Furthermore, some national associations oversee more
than one country. The Football Association is the national association that
oversees Britain, Scotland, and Ireland,382 which means that players transferred
between clubs in these three countries do not need an International Transfer
Certificate, and therefore the new regulations do not apply to these transfers.383
This creates a significant loophole for these three countries.
VII. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
FIFA’s RSTP (2009) will hopefully help curb some of the European
trading of minor football players, but there still seem to be enough loopholes
for clubs to circumvent the rules. Furthermore, many of the problems fall
outside of the scope of FIFA’s authority. Therefore, other organizations such
as the EU institutions need to step in. A report by the Committee on Culture
and Education noted the problems with trafficking in football in its 2006
Report on the Future of Professional Football, and submitted a Motion for a
European Parliament Resolution.384 Although the report provides support for
the home-grown rule,385 the committee “is convinced that additional
arrangements are necessary to ensure that the home-grown players initiative
does not lead to child trafficking.”386 The report further “insists that
immigration law must always be respected in relation to the recruitment of
young foreign talent.” 387 Unfortunately, the report does not offer specific steps
that the governing bodies of football or the EU should take to prevent the
abuse of immigration laws in football.388 This Part first suggests changes that
FIFA and UEFA should implement.389 Next, it suggests changes that the EU
381 Graham Fisher, Everton Sign 7 Year-Old Harry Yates—Is This Too Young?, SOCCERLENS (Mar. 26,
2008), http://soccerlens.com/harry-yates-everton-sign-7-year-old-goalie/6792.
382 See New Regulations for the International Transfer and First Registration of Players Under the Age of
18, supra note 379.
383 Id.
384 See Report on the Future of Professional Football in Europe, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2006/2130(INI))
(2007).
385 Id. at 9.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 See id.
389 See infra Part VII.A.
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institutions should enact.390 Finally, it discusses actions international
organizations should take to help eliminate child trafficking in international
football.391
A. Solutions for Implementation by the Governing Bodies of Football
1. Amendments to FIFA RSTP (2009)
FIFA took a step in the right direction to help protect minors through the
enactment of RSTP (2009). As of the writing of this Comment, however, it is
still too early to know how great of an impact the new transfer regulations will
have on minors. One potential problem is that these rules might unintentionally
harm minors at an even younger age. For example, RSTP (2009) requires the
Players’ Status Committee to appoint a subcommittee to review each
International Transfer Certificate for transfers involving minors.392 Under
Article 9(2) of RSTP (2009), however, players under the age of twelve do not
need an International Transfer Certificate to transfer internationally.393 This
leads to a fear that the clubs will start recruiting children who are eleven years
old or younger because the subcommittee only reviews international transfer of
minors between the age of twelve and eighteen.394 Reports suggest that two
clubs have already enrolled seven-year-old boys in their youth training
academies.395 Therefore, it would be in the best interest of the children if RSTP
(2009) required the subcommittee to supervise all international transfers of
minors regardless of whether the transfer requires an International Transfer
Certificate. The subcommittee would then look at each case and ensure the
transfer conforms to the FIFA regulations and is in the best interest of the
child.
2. Removal of the UEFA Home-Grown Rule and Allocation of Money to
Youth Training Academies
According to UEFA, the home-grown rule aims to encourage investment in
youth training academies and re-nationalize and re-localize club teams.396

390
391
392
393
394
395
396

See infra Part VII.B.
See infra Part VII.C.
FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 18.
Id. at 12.
See supra notes 371–72 and accompanying text.
Id.
ARNAUT, supra note 37, at 115.
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These goals, however, have not necessarily been achieved, and the rule likely
violates fundamental rights under EU law.397 Therefore, UEFA should remove
the home-grown rule. A more effective way to attain this goal without
violating the free movement of workers would be to require clubs to invest a
certain percentage of their revenues in local youth training academies. This
would ensure that clubs spend at least a certain percentage of their money on
local academies rather than spending the money on foreign players. In turn,
clubs might be able to support more players at their training academies, which
would create a larger pool of local talent. This would assist UEFA in achieving
the re-nationalization of club teams. The main problem with this solution is
that it is not viable for the small clubs. This can be resolved, however, by
implementing Advocate General Lenz’s suggestion in Bosman: redistribution
of wealth to poorer clubs from broadcasting money to prevent the wealthiest
clubs from monopolizing the best players.398 Distributing a certain percentage
of the broadcasting money to the poorer clubs’ training facilities would help
solve this problem.
In the United States, the National Football League (“NFL”) implements a
revenue sharing system for its franchise teams.399 Revenues from broadcasting
and merchandise sales are divided among teams, which provides protection for
small market teams.400 Sharing of broadcasting revenues would take place on a
smaller scale in European Football. Rather than distributing the UEFA
broadcasting revenues to all the clubs, the money would only be distributed to
clubs that fall below a certain revenue level. Furthermore, these clubs could
only use the money to invest in their local youth training academies. If these
smaller clubs could develop larger facilities then more players could attend,
which would create a greater pool of potentially talented players. This
assertion also applies to the big clubs that would be required to allocate a
certain percentage of revenues to their local youth training academies. If a big
club were required to invest in its local training academy, then it might focus
more on the local youth, which would enable it to discover more local talent.
FIFA also generates an exorbitant amount of money through the sale of
broadcasting rights. FIFA received $2.7 billion solely for the television
397

See supra notes 331–39 and accompanying text.
See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz at I-4921, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de
Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040.
399 MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE WINNERS: USING SPORTS AND CULTURAL CENTERS AS TOOLS
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 90 (2009).
400 Id.
398
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broadcast rights to the 2010 World Cup.401 One would imagine that FIFA
would distribute some of this money to support African youth training
academies and raise awareness of trafficking in youth football. FIFA, however,
dropped a potential campaign to raise awareness of the youth trafficking
problem due to “budgetary constraints.”402
B. Solutions for Implementation by the EU Institutions
1. Control of Illegal Immigration and Standardized Athletic Visas for
Third-Country Nationals
In general, “[v]isas and border controls are . . . aimed at preventing
irregular or undesired entry into the territory of Member States or intercepting
irregular entry at the border.”403 As of the writing of this Comment, however,
there is no uniform visa or external border control system in the EU.
Accordingly, third-country nationals who want to come to Europe to play
football will go through the EU member state with the least restrictive visa or
work permit application.404 Once these players obtain the appropriate visa, they
can get residence permits and even obtain citizenship through naturalization in
certain member states.405 At this point, the person will have EU citizenship and
receive the free movement protections granted to workers in the EU under
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.406
Therefore, it seems that a unification of the visa application for athletes would
be the best solution to regulate the entry of foreign players into Europe and
help reduce illegal immigration of athletes.
In the United States, for example, different categories of visas exist for
beneficiaries seeking employment as an athlete. For example, a P visa is a
temporary nonimmigrant visa for athletes.407 Under this visa there are four
categories (P-1 to P-4), and one must meet different criteria for each

401 Alastair Barr, A Star Abroad Burns Out at Home, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2010, 7:59 PM), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703630404575052744025057862.html.
402 Matt Scott, FIFA “Abandons” Child Trafficking Campaign, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:10
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2010/feb/04/fifa-child-trafficking-sepp-blatter.
403 STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW 94 (2d. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (2000).
404 See supra Part V.A.1.
405 EU Immigration Study, supra note 276, at 46.
406 TFEU art. 45.
407 Eileen F. Morrison, Representing Athletes and Entertainment Groups: The P Visa, in IMMIGRATION
PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.2 (Supp. 2009).
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category.408 The four categories include: an athlete who is a member of an
entertainment group; an athlete who is part of an exchange program; an athlete
participating in a culturally unique program; and a dependent or a spouse of an
athlete.409 All applications for these permits are submitted to one office, the
Vermont Service Center, which “has jurisdiction over all sports-related
nonimmigrant visa applications in the United States.”410
Adoption of a similar program in the EU would help solve many of the
problems regarding the international transfer of athletes. Under this proposed
solution, every third-country national seeking to play for a club within the EU
would have to obtain an EU athletic visa. The EU should appoint one
committee to receive and review all these applications under the same
standards. Each member state, however, could still regulate its own visas and
resident permits. Therefore, the EU athletic visa would not impede member
states’ sovereignty. The EU athletic visa would simply be an additional entry
requirement for every third-country national. UEFA would have to require
each club to put a copy of every third-country national’s EU athletic visa on
file with the governing national association if the club were located in a
member state. This plan also is in accord with the EU’s desire to create a
common immigration policy.411
2. Standardization of Contract Law
Another problem that has been presented for clubs within the EU is the lack
of uniformity in contract law.412 No uniform contract law exists regarding the
age of consent for a minor to enter into an enforceable contract. Accordingly,
some national associations do not allow minors to sign professional contracts
until the age of eighteen, while others allow minors to sign contracts at the age
of sixteen.413 One way to solve this problem is to create an EU law that allows
all minors to enter into enforceable contracts at the age of sixteen.414
Theoretically, this would be a great way to solve the differences in member
states’ contract laws. It is very difficult, however, to harmonize national law in

408

Id. § 9.1.
Id.
410 Reiss, supra note 288, at 7.
411 EU Immigration Study, supra note 276, at 19.
412 See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
413 See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.
414 The EU legislation could also include a provision allowing minors to void contracts that put them at a
major disadvantage until they reach the age of eighteen.
409
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the manner, and harmonization depends largely on the cooperation of member
states.415
FIFA and UEFA regulations do not restrict the age a minor can sign a
professional contract. Therefore, the national associations decide the
appropriate age that minors are allowed to enter into a professional contract
with a club. If a club believes it is disadvantaged because it is losing players
who transfer to teams that can offer professional contracts, then it must voice
its complaints to the governing national association.
C. Solutions for Implementation by Independent and International
Organizations
Individuals who are aware of the problems of child trafficking in
international football have also formed non-governmental organizations and
independent groups to help raise awareness and combat abuses faced by
minors. For example, Jean-Claude Mbvoumin started a French nongovernmental organization called Culture Foot Solidaire to help raise
awareness and help young football players faced with trafficking and illegal
agents.416 Culture Foot Solidaire most recently wrote an open letter to FIFA
President, Sepp Blatter, in 2010 regarding “Combating the Traffic of Young
African Footballers.”417 This letter discusses a prevention campaign to combat
trafficking of young football players, which FIFA abandoned in 2009.418 The
letter points out that “[i]f this campaign is not instituted we fear that after the
2010 World Cup the traffic of young minors will not only be a long-term
feature of the African sporting landscape but indeed it will become worse: it
will be institutionalised.”419
Others have worked to help abandoned players in Europe on a smaller
scale. For example, individuals that have noticed young African players
abandoned in the streets of Europe have started football teams to allow these
children to play and hopefully give them a second chance to be seen by

415

CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTRACT LAW 42 (2008).
Culture Foot Solidaire Protecting Youth, FIFA.COM (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/
worldwideprograms/news/newsid=920094.html.
417 Matt Scott, FIFA “Abandons” Child Trafficking Campaign, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:10
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2010/feb/04/fifa-child-trafficking-sepp-blatter.
418 Id.
419 Id.
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European clubs.420 In Greece, two former football managers started an amateur
team, the Black Diamonds, after they noticed stranded African players
wandering in the streets.421 The managers organize exhibition games with
professional teams to help showcase the players to professional clubs.422
South Africa hosted the 2010 World Cup, which was a significant step to
increasing recognition of African football. People all over the world watched,
which opened a great opportunity to raise awareness of the unlicensed agents
throughout Africa. Hopefully, awareness campaigns will make African
families think twice about sending their children to Europe with these agents.
On a more pessimistic note, however, the 2010 World Cup might have also
given young African boys unrealistic dreams of becoming a star footballer,
which would allow false agents more opportunities to swoop in and illegally
bring them to Europe from Africa. Therefore, as Mbvoumin pointed out in his
letter to FIFA, it is crucial to start awareness campaigns in Africa as soon as
possible.423
CONCLUSION
The Bosman case, the subsequent FIFA transfer regulations, and the
amendments made to the transfer regulations over time have played a major
role in forming the sport of football as the world knows it today. These transfer
regulations, however, have had many negative effects on minors and the
problems have been difficult to fix due to certain conflicts of laws. Fortunately,
FIFA, UEFA, the EU, and other international organizations have begun to
acknowledge these problems and have started to take action. The best results
will be achieved if these organizations can collaborate to enact the solutions
discussed in Part IV. UEFA should take the first additional step towards
protecting minors by removing the home-grown rule. In turn, this will
hopefully eliminate the motivation behind clubs seeking young foreign players
to fulfill the home-grown quota. Additionally, raising awareness regarding the
trafficking of minors would decrease fake agents’ ability to deceive young
African boys and their families. The greater the collaboration between the
relevant governing bodies and organizations involved with European football,

420 Christos Gavalas, Anything to Score, NYU LIVEWIRE (Mar. 7, 2007), http://journalism.nyu.edu/
publishing/archives/livewire/sports/ghana_soccer/index.html.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 See supra notes 417–19 and accompanying text.
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the greater the chance that the problems relating to the transfer of minors in
international football will be solved.
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